Supreme Court Judgments Cruelty on Husband and Divorce
Amarjit Kaur vs Harbhajan Singh And AnrEquivalent citations: Bench: D Raju, H Sema - 2003 (1) AWC 344 SC, (2003) 2 CALLT 23 SC - 23 October, 2002
Order
1.
The above appeals have been filed against the order of a learned single
judge of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh dated
10.11.2000 in civil revision No. 5057/ 1998 and a subsequent order dated
7.12.2000 passed in a review application No. 112-C-II/2000.
2.
Heard Mr. Raju Ramachandran, learned senior counsel for the appellant
and Mr. K. Rajendra Choudhary, learned senior counsel for the
respondent.
3. The appellant is the wife of the first respondent.
The respondent - husband has filed a petition under Section 13 of the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 before the court of learned district judge,
Ludhiana seeking dissolution of the marriage by grant of a decree for
divorce on the grounds of alleged adultery and cruelty. The said
petition is still pending for trial and final disposal. Pending the said
petition, the appellant herein filed an application under Section 24 of
the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 claiming maintenance for a sum of Rs.
3000/- per month for herself and Rs. 1000/- each for minor children
residing with her. There is no dispute over the fact that out of the
lawful wedlock, the appellant has given birth to three daughters and one
son, of which, one daughter is said to be with the appellant. There is
yet another son who is also living with the appellant-wife, who also is
claimed to be a son borne out of the lawful wedlock, though the
respondent-husband would raise doubts about the details of parentage of
the said child. Having regard to the fact that a limited notice has been
issued in this case, confined to the question with regard to the order
passed by the High Court for conducting a DNA test of the child, it is
unnecessary to deal with the details with reference to the claims made
by the respective parties about the details of income of either of the
parties. Suffice it to state that the learned trial judge has chosen to
reject the claim for interim maintenance and on a revision before the
High Court, the learned single judge though was prepared to countenance
the claim of the wife and as a matter of fact directed the respondent
-husband to pay Rs. 2000/- by way of litigation expenses to the
appellant and pay a further sum of Rs. 2000/- per month by way of
maintenance from the date of her application, proceeded further and
observed as follows :-
"During the course of the submissions, it
was suggested to the counsel for the petitioner and his client Smt.
Amarjit Kaur whether they are willing to get DNA test of the male child
namely Samarjit Singh. Before concluding, directions are also given to
the trial court to order for conducting the DNA test of the male child
who is in the custody of the petitioner and if the test goes against the
petitioner, she will not be entitled to get any maintenance pendente
lite for herself but she will definitely get the maintenance for the
girl child whose maintenance is fixed at Rs. 1000/- per month."
4.
Aggrieved, the wife moved an application by way of review and sought to
bring to the notice of the court the decision reported in Goutam Kundu
v. State of West Bengal and Anr., The learned single judge, by a cryptic
order, has chosen to reject the review application with costs, in a sum
of Rs. 1000/- Hence, the above appeals.
5. The learned senior
counsel for the appellant strenuously contended that the conduct of the
parties which requires to be adjudicated in the main writ petition has
no relevance, at the stage of granting interim or pendente lite
maintenance and that the consideration in this regard has to be confined
to the criteria specified in Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act,
1955. It was also pointed out that imposition of a condition which will
operate as a disfeasance clause, to deprive the very maintenance order
to be paid, particularly of the nature imposed in this case directing
the conduct of DNA test of the male child in question is not warranted.
Argued the learned counsel further that this Court in the decision in
Goutam Kundu's case (supra), declared the legal position as to the
circumstances under which and the limitations to be observed in
compelling anyone to give a sample of blood against his/her will for DNA
analysis, keeping in view, the serious consequences flowing from the
same, i.e., the branding of a child as a bastard and the mother as an
unchaste woman. It was made clear therein that no adverse inference can
be drawn against the person for his refusal. According to the learned
counsel for the appellant, such an order could not and ought not to have
been made at this stage and in the manner it has been done, by the
court on its own imposing the same as a conditional direction affecting
even the right to get pendent lite maintenance, without even their being
any formal application from the respondent - husband and justifying any
such claim, in accordance with law.
6. Per contra, the learned
senior counsel appearing for the respondent, relying on the decision
reported in Dwarika Prasad Satpathy v. Bidyut Prava Dixit and Anr., JT
1999 (8) SC 329 contended that in the matter of grant of maintenance,
there is no impediment for the court to impose a condition of the nature
and in case of refusal to cooperate to conduct the DNA test, make the
defaulting party suffer consequences thereof. It was also urged that no
exception could be taken to the course adopted by the learned single
judge in the light of the serious dispute raised with reference to the
parentage of one male child living with the wife. The learned counsel
also contended that the discretion exercised by the learned single judge
of the High Court on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case,
is not at all a matter which needs or calls for any interference in an
appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
7. We have carefully considered the submissions of learned counsel appearing on either side.
8.
Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 empowers the court in any
proceeding under the Act, if it appears to the court that either the
wife or the husband, as the case may be, has no independent income
sufficient for her or his support and the necessary expenses of the
proceeding, it may, on the application of any one of them order the
other party to pay to the petitioner the expenses of the proceeding and
monthly maintenance as may seem to be reasonable during the proceeding,
having regard to also the income of both the petitioner and the
respondent. Once the High Court, in this case, has come to the
conclusion that the wife - appellant herein has to be provided with the
litigation expenses and monthly maintenance, it is beyond comprehension
as to how, de hors the criteria laid down in the statutory provision
itself, the court could have thought of imposing an extraneous
condition, with a default clause which is likely to defeat the very
claim which has been sustained by the court itself. Consideration as to
the ultimate outcome of the main proceeding after regular trial would be
wholly alien to assess the need or necessity for awarding interim
maintenance, as long as the marriage, the dissolution of which has been
sought, cannot be disputed, and the marital relationship of husband and
wife subsisted. As noticed earlier, the relevant statutory consideration
being only that either of the party, who was the petitioner in the
application under Section 24 of the Act, has no independent income
sufficient for her or his support, for the grant of interim maintenance,
the same has to be granted and the discretion thereafter left with the
court, in our view, is only with reference to reasonableness of the
amount that could be awarded and not to impose any condition, which has
self-defeating consequence. Therefore, we are unable to approve of the
course adopted by the learned single judge, in this case.
9.
Coming now to the nature of the condition imposed, though, it has been
seriously contended for the appellant that no such condition could have
been imposed to compel the undergoing of a DNA test of the male child,
we do not propose to express any opinion on the legality or propriety of
the court undertaking consideration at the appropriate stage, by the
court competent, in the main petition of any application moved in an
appropriate manner according to law, but we would confine our
consideration to the limited aspect as to whether the High Court could
have imposed such a condition at the stage of awarding interim
maintenance pendente lite and that too without an application for the
purpose from the other party, at the instance of the court by way of a
suggestion put to the appellant in the course of consideration of the
application for interim maintenance. The law in the matter governing the
consideration and passing of any order in respect of a claim for DNA
test has sufficiently been laid down by this Court and if a party to a
proceeding cannot be compelled against his/her wish to undergo any such
test, we fail to see how the court on its own could have imposed a
condition without any consideration whatsoever of any of the criteria
laid down by this Court, by adopting a novel device of imposing it as a
condition for the grant of the interim maintenance, with a default
clause, which as rightly contended for the appellant, will have the
inevitable consequences of predetermining the claim about the parentage
with serious consequences even at the preliminary stage. The procedure,
thus, adopted by the High Court does not appear to be neither just nor
reasonable or in conformity with the principles of law laid down by this
Court and consequently the order is liable to be set aside. The
decision in Dwarika Prasad Satpathy v. Bidyut Prava Dixit and Anr.
(supra) relied for the respondent, in our view, has no relevance or
application to the case on hand. That was a case wherein, in dealing
with a claim for maintenance invoking the summary proceedings under
Section 125 of the Cr.P.C., the husband attempted to defeat the claim
made by the wife by asserting non performance of essential rites at the
time of marriage, the factum of which as well as the parentage of the
child could not be questioned. In the process of ascertaining the
genuineness of the said stand, when the suggestion made to the husband
to undergo DNA test was refused by him, and the court dealing with the
application by summary proceedings chose to observe that the husband was
disentitled to challenge the paternity of the child in the proceedings
under Section 125 Cr.P.C., this Court declined to interfere with the
order of the trial court on the question of prima facie satisfaction
recorded as to the proof of marriage. We see absolutely no general
principle of law laid down in this case which could be said to lend any
support to the plea on behalf of the respondent. We are unable to
persuade ourselves to agree with the plea urged for the respondent that
the case does not warrant our interference in these appeals, since, we
find that a serious and flagrant violation of law has been committed by
the High Court, in the matter disposing of the revision and review
petition, and the same ought not to be allowed to get sanctified, with
our approval, too.
10. The order passed rejecting the review
application summarily despite the fact that a judgment of this Court
relevant for the purpose has been brought to the notice of the court,
without even expressing any view on the matter, by itself, is sufficient
to set aside the order made on the review petition. It is really
surprising that the court should have thought of awarding cost in a sum
of Rs. 1000/- against the wife, who was before the court seeking for
maintenance pendente lite.
11. The appeals are allowed. The order
in so far as it relates to the offending condition relating to the DNA
test is set aside. In other respects, the order in so far as it awards
the litigation expenses and monthly maintenance is sustained. We make it
clear that we are not expressing any opinion about the rights of the
parties to seek for the relief for the DNA test or the evidentiary value
of the same and the trial court shall be at liberty to consider the
matter relating to such claims on their own merits, in accordance with
law. No costs.